Who do you trust?

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Click to hear his investment strategies (MP3 format, no download required)

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A prescient view of events that transpired in 4 1/2 years since the interview memorialized below

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Original Podcast via Resonance 104.4, a London based news service

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Taleb put a psychological, mathematical, and (mostly) practical framework around the philosophical problems in a long lineage of skeptical philosophers, including Socrates, Sextus Empiricus, Al-Ghazali, Pierre Bayle, Montaigne, David Hume and Karl Popper in believing that we know much less than we think we do, and that the past should not be used naively to predict the future. Furthermore, as a practitioner he creates a decision-making framework of "how to act under incomplete understanding, imperfect information". Taleb now focuses on being a researcher in the philosophy of randomness and the role of uncertainty in science and society, with particular emphasis on the philosophy of history and the role of fortunate or unfortunate high-impact random events, which he calls "black swans", in determining the course of history.

Taleb believes that most people ignore "black swans" because we are more comfortable seeing the world as something structured, ordinary, and comprehensible. Taleb calls this blindness the Platonic fallacy, and argues that it leads to three distortions:

1. Narrative fallacy: creating a story post-hoc so that an event will seem to have an identifiable cause.
2. Ludic fallacy: believing that the unstructured randomness found in life resembles the structured randomness found in games. Taleb faults random walk models and other inspirations of modern probability theory for this inadequacy.
3. Statistical regress fallacy: believing that the structure of probability can be delivered from a set of data.




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nassim_Taleb

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Goldman Sachs Shenanigans

http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/07/r ... ldman.html

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http://fora.tv/2009/02/19/Stiglitz_Temp ... _Necessary

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http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/07/o ... media.html

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* We're all in denial
* We're replacing private debt with public debt.
* We're not dealing with the cancer in our banking system.
* We're not making the structural changes we need to make.
* We're not being aggressive enough about restructuring debt (debt for equity swaps).
* Bernanke is a wimpy Greenspan sycophant
* Obama's rewarding the fools who got us here (Summers, Bernanke, Geithner)
* The banksters are taking over again

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Is Strong Dollar possible?





http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/In ... ation.aspx

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Obamageddon / Revolution in 2012



More Celente on King World News on the Goldman Crime Family

http://kingworldnews.com/kingworldnews/ ... lente.html

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Bill Murphy


Chris Powell

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despite short term strength.

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Dr. Robert L. Hirsch, Ph.D., Senior Energy Advisor, Management Information Services, Inc. (MISI)
Topic: The Decline of World Oil Production & Its Possible Impacts


Keith Neumeyer, President & CEO,
First Majestic Silver Corp. (TSX: FR)

Lorne Waldman, Corporate Secretary, Silvercorp Metals Inc. (TSX: SVM)






Mark H. Bailey, Director, President & CEO, Minefinders Corporation Ltd.
(TSX: MFL | AMEX: MFN)

Peter Barnes, President, CEO & Director, Silver Wheaton Corp. (TSX: SLW)

Rachel Benepe, Portfolio Manager - Gold Fund, First Eagle Funds
Topic: Value Gold Investing

Robert A. Quartermain, President & CEO, Director, Silver Standard Resources Inc. (TSX: SSO | NASDAQ: SSRI)

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FAME - Foundation for the Advancement of Monetary Education




Interviewed by Jim Puplava April 10, 2010

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JT: This is the biggest fraud in the history of the capital markets. And it’s not something that happened last week. It happened when these loans were originated, in some cases years ago. Loans have representations and warranties that have to be met. In the past, you had a certain period of time, 60 to 90 days, where you sort through these loans and, if they’re bad, you kick them back. If the documentation wasn’t correct, you’d kick it back. If you found the incomes of the buyers had been overstated, or the houses had been appraised at twice their worth, you’d kick it back. But that didn’t happen here. And it turned out there were loan files that were missing required documentation. Part of putting the deal together is that the securitization professional, and in this case that’s banks like Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, has to watch for this stuff. It’s called perfecting the security interest, and it’s not optional.

EK: And how much danger are the banks themselves in?

JT: When we had the financial crisis, the first thing the banks did was run to Congress and ask for accounting relief. They asked to be able to avoid pricing this stuff at the price where people would buy them. So no one can tell you the size of the hole in these balance sheets. We’ve thrown a lot of money at it. TARP was just the tip of the iceberg. We’ve given them guarantees on debts, low-cost funding from the Fed. But a lot of these mortgages just cannot be saved. Had we acknowledged this problem in 2005, we could’ve cleaned it up for a few hundred billion dollars. But we didn’t. Banks were lying and committing fraud, and our regulators were covering them and so a bad problem has become a hellacious one.

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-k ... _in_t.html

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